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Immigrant workers and their labor force participation in host countries have received critical 
attention in all concerned disciplines, principally owing to its strong implications for well-being 
of natives. The ageing population in many rich countries and several related and unrelated 
issues including global integration, pension provisions or security threats keeps immigration 
under continuous impact evaluation. However, of the several studies that dealt with patterns 
and consequences aspects of labor migration, only a handful discusses asymmetric 
information across transnational labor markets despite agreement that a standardized 
screening mechanism is unavailable. At the same time, several empirical studies show that 
immigrants are proportionally overrepresented in self-employment, vis-à-vis natives of 
equivalent skill levels. We try to explain this phenomenon based on asymmetric information 
in the host country labor market. We focus on the design of a contract menu by the 
employers, which when offered to a mixed cohort of immigrants facilitates self-selection in 
favor of paid employment or the outside option of self-employment/entrepreneurship. We also 
discuss countervailing incentives among the mixed cohort. 
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1. Introduction 
Existence of asymmetric information in the labor market generates a wide variety 
of implications for both firms and workers.  In particular, for those who are fresh in the 
labor market, information asymmetry in the labor market is intrinsic to a situation where 
(at least initially) employers do not know the productivity levels of potential employees.  
It can arise if the markets are isolated such that “information does not ordinarily flow 
across them (or does not flow costlessly and freely)” (Katz and Stark, 1987, p. 718).  
Clearly, the problem of asymmetric information may turn out to be of monumental 
significance when it comes to employing migrant labor – the ones which originate in 
spatially separated, culturally and information-wise distant countries.
1  The intensified 
mobility of labor in search of jobs across national borders is an important constituent of 
the process of global integration and this has significantly affected the labor market 
operations at both ends.  This paper focuses on the impact on recipient countries only, 
with lack of readily verifiable information instrumental in shaping employee and 
employer behavior.  In the presence of asymmetric information, signaling by workers and 
screening by employers are the only two devices that reinstate symmetry.  In fact, it is 
well known due to Spence (1973, 1974) that better quality workers can signal at a lower 
marginal cost of signaling activity.  Later, Stiglitz (1975) offered a screening device by 
virtue of which more able workers can take an accurate test at a fixed cost.
2  We discuss 
an alternative – the offer of a contract menu by the employers which can overcome 
                                                 
1 In this context, Chau and Stark (1999, p. 455) note, “whatever workers may take with them when they 
migrate, they cannot possibly transfer their home countries’ information structure”.  Also see Friedberg 
(2000) with respect to migrants to Israel.    
 
2 In Stiglitz’s model the firms are less responsive to profit possibilities – a condition that is relaxed in 
Yabushita (1983), who show among other things that striking similarities exist between Stiglitz and Spence 
models.       3
informational asymmetry with particular reference to immigrants.    
It should be noted that while screening devices may be tenable for labor 
originating within the boundaries of one country or countries with erstwhile colonial 
connections, a sweeping applicability of such devices remain inconceivable even in this 
high age of standardization and information flow.  Thus, if more generally, the problem is 
cast as one with lack of interpretable and verifiable information then large migrant-
receiving countries such as USA, Canada, Germany, France or Australia are expected to 
suffer initially from high degrees of uncertainty regarding the true skill level of many 
immigrant workers.  It is best borne out in several studies by Dustmann and others 
(2005a, 2005b, 2003) that language proficiencies and cultural distances shape labor 
market behavior of immigrants to a large extent.  In a sense, absence of readily 
interpretable attributes lead to similar information blackouts as one observes in the 
context of rural-urban migration, which makes asymmetric information generic to all 
forms of spatial migration of labor.  Therefore, if asymmetric information is substantial 
and pre-employment signaling and screening are costly and/or inefficient, employers tend 
to offer pooled wage across mixed immigrant cohorts until the true skill levels are 
discovered (Katz and Stark, 1987; Chau and Stark, 1999; etc).  This is an exposition of 
the nature of wage contracts employers prefer to enter into in the presence of asymmetric 
information and leaves the better types adversely affected.   
But, there can be more sophisticated contracts.  In this thought experiment, we use 
a mixed cohort of immigrants to many OECD countries as the target group on which a 
better designed contract is implemented.  However, the results should be meaningful for 
domestic labor markets as well where ready interpretability of skills is difficult.    4
Similarly, we assumed an outside option of self-employment for the immigrants, which 
serves as an example amidst several other possibilities.
 3 We stick to self-employment as 
a broad category primarily because there exists substantial evidence in favor of 
successful, multigenerational self-employment practices among immigrants, which we 
discuss shortly.  The exercise is based on the assumption that native employers do not 
(or, minimally) encounter similar problems with native job applicants, as credentials of 
locals are readily interpretable and verifiable.  On the same note, the study would 
concentrate only on those who migrate for jobs and do not engage in education/training in 
the host country.
4   
We formulate that there is a pool of immigrant workers whose productivity is 
unknown to the native firms.  But this pool consists of two types of workers, high 
productivity and low productivity.  The high productivity workers also have an outside 
option in the form of self-employment, while the low productivity workers entirely 
depend on the spot labor market offering a fixed pooled wage.  The firm hires either from 
the spot market, or by offering individualized contracts.  The first option yields a fixed 
profit regardless of the worker’s productivity.  The second option can potentially yield 
higher profit if the worker is turned out to be high productivity type; but then information 
rent has to be conceded to screen the workers via incentive compatible contracts.
5  We 
wish to study when the firm will opt for the contract route and when for the spot market 
route.  When the spot market is preferred, the high productivity immigrants will opt for 
                                                 
3 Individuals are “self-employed if they earn no wages or salary, but derive their incomes by exercising 
their profession or business on their own account and/or for their own risk” (De Wit, 1993, p. 2).   
4 See Kar (2009) for a characterization of occupational patterns among immigrants in the presence of 
asymmetric information in the labor market.  High self-employment participation among immigrants turns 
out to be a result of statistical discrimination by the employers.      
5 In a related context Bester (1989) shows that long-term incentive compatible wage contracts offer higher 
utility compared to spot-market wages, and in effect the long-term wage contracts are rationed.   5
self-employment.  Potentially, this generates an occupational distribution in the economy, 
and we can identify the underlying parameters of this distribution.  
One may expect on the basis of the standard results of the agency theory that the 
high productivity type will be employed at the first best level, and he will also be paid a 
slightly higher wage above his self-employment income, while the low productivity type 
will be under-employed and paid only his reservation utility.  If this intuition were correct 
the high productivity type would be hired slightly less often than under full information.  
But that is not the case.  The combination of asymmetric information and self-
employment opportunity may change this commonly accepted intuition.  While 
information rent or incentive cost inevitably arises due to asymmetric information, the 
self-employment option introduces certain countervailing incentives.  As a result, 
information rent can sometimes disappear, and even be reversed from the high 
productivity type to the low productivity type (see Lewis and Sappington, 1989; Maggi 
and Rodriguez-Clare, 1995 for more on countervailing incentives).  When the 
information rent disappears, the firm’s profit rises; in this sense countervailing incentives 
are beneficial for the firm.  But on the other hand, when the high productivity type is 
under-employed and the low-productivity worker is given information rent, firm’s profit 
significantly falls.  Tension between these two forces makes the firm opt for spot market 
more often that it would if the immigrant workers did not have the self-employment 
option.  Since the spot market is relied upon more often, in equilibrium high productivity 
immigrant workers will also be self-employed more often.  
 Most other work in this area, however, deals with characterization of job 
contracts when asymmetric information prevails on the ‘state of nature’ facing the firm   6
(for example, Azariadis, 1983; Ferguson and Jhang, 1994; etc. discuss employment 
contracts when firms have better knowledge of their market conditions than workers do).  
Apart from that, some consider cases where firms compete with each other to attract self-
proclaimed high-ability workers whose true productivity is unknown and conclude that 
such workers will signal if the wage offers are substantially high in the presence of 
competition (see Janssen, 2002).               
Our approach differs considerably from these types of studies in the sense that the 
contract menu we device induces the workers to reveal their true types, and hence 
influences self-selection in the labor market.  This should, on the one hand, lower 
employers’ dependence on other screening devices, and on the other reduce direct costs 
borne by both employers and employees owing to asymmetric information.  Moreover we 
identify the presence of countervailing incentives and incentive reversals depending upon 
the range within which labor productivity at the firm level varies and some of these 
results are rather dramatic.  As already mentioned, this may also provide a strong 
explanation as to why for north America, western Europe and other developed countries 
empirical estimates show higher self-employment rate among immigrants vis-à-vis the 
native born (Bates, 1997; Clark and Drinkwater, 2000; Li, 1997; Yuengert, 1995; Fairlie 
and Meyer, 1996, 2003; etc., for USA and UK; Razin, 1992, a case study for Israel with 
respect to Asian, African, East European and N. American immigrants; Kidd, 1993 for 
Australia etc).
6 All of these studies emphasize that in many rich countries, immigrants as 
well as ethnic minorities are proportionately over-represented in self-employment; i.e. the 
immigrant self-employment rate exceeds that of the native population.  Of course, there 
                                                 
6 Fairlie (1996), for example, shows that the Korean American men and women have self-employment rates 
of 27.9 and 18.9 %, respectively, and followed by Lebanese immigrants and so on.  Kidd (1993) shows that 
among skilled Australian immigrants (collegiate), self-employment rate exceeds that of natives.       7
are a number of other explanations for high rate of minority and immigrant self-
employment in these countries.  They include, labor market discrimination (Borjas and 
Bronars, 1989; Fairlie 1996, etc.), enclave effects and language proficiency (Borjas, 
1986, although lacks support from later studies viz. Clark and Drinkwater, 2000; 
Yeungert, 1995, etc), and source country cultural traits (Bonacich and Modell, 1981; 
Bates, 1997; Borjas, 1987; Constant and Zimmerman, 2006; Duleep and Regets, 1997; 
Dustmann et al, 2005a, 2005b, 2003; Fairlie, 2005; Funkhouser and Trejo, 1995; 
LaLonde and Topel, 1992; Light, 1984).           
The remaining part of the paper is designed as follows.  Section 1 offers the 
general formulation of the problem, section 2 introduces asymmetric information and the 
following subsections fully characterize the nature and efficiency of labor market 
contracts.  Section 3 discusses possibilities of countervailing incentives and section 4 
concludes.        
 
1. The  Model 
 
  Consider a firm and a continuum of workers with a mass of 1. The firm is 
assumed to be price taker in the product market, but has market power in the labor 
market. Its market power is reflected in the fact that it can offer individualized contracts 
to workers depending on their characteristics and such contracts are take-it-or-leave-it 
offers. For simplicity, labor is the main input for production and the production function 
is linear. The profit function facing the firm is: 
w al    .        ( 1 )    
Here  denotes profit, l is the amount of labor employed, a is the labor productivity in the 
firm and w is the wage.  The firm has two options: hire from the spot market or hire   8
through contracts. The spot market hiring yields a profit of 0.  Since this is the least the 
firm can make, it becomes its reservation profit.  
In the contract market, the firm has the opportunity to tailor its offer in terms of 
the productivity of the worker and thus can earn greater profit; but it does not have 
complete information about the workers. In particular, it cannot discern the true type of 
the workers who vary in terms of their disutility from work.
7  We assume that Mother 
Nature randomly draws a disutility parameter ( ) affecting the worker’s preference. 
However, after this draw only the workers themselves know about their disutility.  There 
are only two types of workers – one with greater disutility and the other with smaller 
disutility. The greater disutility worker becomes a ‘low productivity worker’ and 
therefore he is called the ‘low’ type.  Conversely, the smaller disutility worker is called 
the ‘high’ type for his ability to contribute more to the firm’s output. They have the 
following utility functions: 






w u           (2.1) 






w u      (2.2) 
As stated, we assume H L    . Without loss of generality set H = 1. The probability of 
being high or low type is p1 and p2 respectively; 1 2 1   p p . These probabilities are 
common knowledge.   
We also assume that these two types also vary with respect to their outside 
options. The low type can work in an outside sector and earn zero reservation utility. But 
                                                 
7 As we have discussed earlier, it may be because the workers are young and that the employer does not 
have requisite information regarding their skill types, and/or the a priori screening system is not efficient to 
allow immediate identification of the true skill types of those who apply for the jobs.   9
the high type can work as self-employed and thus his reservation utility will depend on 
his self-employment production function. We assume that under self-employment 
production function is given as Q=bl.
8 Further, b < a. That is, technologically a firm is 













   .       
   If the firm wishes to offer an employment contract to the worker, especially the 
high type, it has to make him at least as well off as he would be under self-employment. 
With this setup, we wish to derive the firm’s optimal wage-employment contract, and also 
determine when the firm will go for the contract route of hiring instead of the spot 
market. Needless to say, under asymmetric information the optimal contract will be in 
general (but not necessarily) second-best, and to what extent this contract deviates from 
the first best is of some interest.  
The first best contract corresponds to the situation where the firm along with the 
workers learns the realization of . Given the reservation payoff structure of our model, 
the profit maximizing first-best contract (li
*,wi































*  . Note that  . This property of the 
first best contract will be carried onto the second best contract as well.
* *
                                                
H L l l 
9  
 
8 We can rationalize the difference in the outside options of the two types in two ways. Both can at worst 
rely on a competitive market or some sort of public transfer and ensure themselves zero utility; but the high 
type has the additional option of self-employment and the low type does not. This can be for their 
differential access to technology, or credit. In that case access is clearly correlated with their distutility 
from work. Alternatively, we can assume that both types have the option of working as self-employed; but 
the low type’s disutility parameter is so high (relative to b and F) that self-employment is never profitable 
for them. 
9 This point can be formally proved. But since the proof is standard in information economics, we omit this.    10

















  . By comparing H
* 
and 0 we conclude that there exists a value of b, say , where 
_
b a a b H   
0 2
_
2   , 
such that  H
* < 0 at b> . At other values of b, hiring a high productivity worker (via 
contract) is preferable to hiring from the spot market. As for low productivity worker, the 
contract route is preferable only if L





       
2.   Asymmetric Information  
Under asymmetric information, the firm offers a menu of contracts {(lH,wH), 
(lL,wL)}. This has the advantage of ensuring the acceptance of offers as the contract will 
induce self-selection. The firm’s optimal menu contract can be derived by solving the 
following problem: 
Firm’s Problem: Max      L L H H w al p w al p E     2 1      (3) 












































       ( 5 . 2 )  
The constraints (4.1)-(4.2) are incentive compatibility (IC) constraints that ensure 
self-selection by each type from the menu of contracts. Constraints (5.1) and (5.2) 
describe the individual rationality constraints (IR) for both types. Of this, the constraint   11
(5.1) holds special interest for us. For standard asymmetric information problems, the 
reservation utility of the high and low types is generally same. Therefore, any contract 
that is acceptable to the low type is also acceptable to the high type. This implies that the 
high type is to be conceded information rent and the low type is given only his 
reservation utility. Invariably, the low type’s employment will be distorted. In our 
context, the reservation utility of the high type is different, and moreover, it varies 
depending on his self-employment productivity b. This gives rise to the possibility that 
the high type may not always have informational advantage. This will depend on the size 
of b relative to a.  
2.1   Optimality of the first best contract 
First we note that there exists a range of b in which the first best contract remains 
optimal even under asymmetric information. Define  ) ~ ,
~
( w l  as the common value of l and 

























 .     (6) 
We show that if the first best employment levels are such that  , the first best 
contract will remain optimal. The low type (which suffers high disutility from work) will 
find the high type’s employment too high to match the associated high wage, and the high 
type will find the low type’s offer too poor to yield his higher reservation utility. Thus, 




H L l l l  
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,  the optimal menu will consist of the first 
best contracts.  






 the menu of the first best contracts is not 





 , the first 
best menu is not incentive compatible for type L.       
 



























Figure 1: Optimality of the first best contracts   13
In Figure 1 we depict the situation where the first best contracts form the optimal menu. 
Two indifference curves are so drawn that they correspond to the reservation utility 
levels, 0 for type L and  for type H. Of these two, the indifference curve of type H 
shifts up as the value of b increases and thus causes   also to increase, which is 
given by the intersection point C. Greater the value of b, greater the levels of  .  
Here b is such that the first best offer for type H is given by point A (at the tangency point 
of the iso-profit curve and the indifference curve) and the same for type L is given by 
point B. That these offers are incentive compatible is evident from the fact that point B 
lies below the lowest indifference curve of type H, and point A lies below the lowest 
indifference curve of type L. The profit of the firm is also at the first best level. This 
natural separation of the types is reflected in the fact that lL
* < <lH
*, which continues to 
hold if b lies in the critical interval specified in Proposition 1. Outside this interval, two 












2.2   Second best contract 
Since lL
* and lH










), it is clear that at 
appropriately small values of b, we will have    , while at appropriately high 
values of b, we will have    In either case, one of the two types has incentive to 
misrepresent when the first best offers are made.  For example if we have , 
points A and B will both lie to the right of C.  Since B will then be above the lowest 
* *
~
H L l l l  
.
~
* * l l l H L  
* *
~
H L l l l    14
indifference curve of type H, he will be better off by choosing point B than point A. 
Conversely if we had , points A and B will both be to the left of point C, in 
which case type L would prefer to pick point A instead of point B. In what follows we 
discuss these two cases. 
~







   Case 1:  
We begin by examining the individual rationality constraints (7.1) and (7.2) and 




, if H  























.  Therefore, the second 
best contract should not concede a higher utility level than uH(lL,wL).  So it must make H 
indifferent between (lL,wL) and (lH,wH) which is to say that ICH must bind. In contrast, 
type L could not choose (lH,wH) and ensure zero utility as long as  .  Thus, IRL 
must bind along with ICH. 
~















w    , and then 
substituting these in expected profit solve the following maximization problem (which 





























1    . 
Three first order conditions for maximization with respect to lH, lL and  (Lagrange 
multiplier) respectively are    15
 0 1   H Hl a p  ,               ( 7 . 1 )  
0 ) ( 2 1        L L L l a p l p ,         ( 7 . 2 )  
0 ] [
~
 l lL  .            ( 7 . 3 )  
The solutions to the above equations give rise to the optimal menu contract that we report 
in the following proposition. 
 
















 , the optimal menu 





























































 , the optimal contracts are 
 and (
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  ).  Both types just get 
their reservation utilities.  
 
Proof: See Appendix 2. 
Proposition 2 shows how under asymmetric information the second best contracts 
will involve distortions in both wage and employment.  There are two ranges of b to 





) we have , the non-binding case.  
~
l lL 
Several points are noteworthy.  First of all, the low type will be underemployed   16
(by the fraction ), while he receives only the reservation utility.  Second, the high type’s 
employment remains at the first best level, and his utility is strictly greater than the 
reservation level.  This is similar to what is observed in standard screening contracts.  
The more efficient type gets information rent in exchange for the first best labor, and the 
less efficient type is given just his reservation utility; but he works less, and is also paid 
less, relative to the first best contract.  Third, the size of the information rent conceded to 
the H type in the form of wage premium depends on how far the L type is under-
employed.  That is, the difference between lL and  matters for the H type’s information 
rent. If lL could be set equal to , type H does not need to be given any information rent. 
So here, for type H, both the incentive compatibility constraint and the individual 
rationality constraint bind simultaneously.  In part (b) of the above proposition we discuss 
this part.  This shows that as b increases, type H’s outside option becomes stronger, but 
he begins to lose his information advantage due to the difficulty of pretending to be type 
L, because with higher b, the low type’s offer becomes increasingly unattractive.  This is 
essentially a reflection of the emergence of countervailing incentives that type H is 
facing.  We know from Proposition 1 that even with higher values of b, he will be pushed 
down to his reservation utility and the firm will be able to extract first best profit.  
Despite having private information and superior productivity, type H loses all his 
advantage due to strengthening of his outside opportunity.  His incentive to misrepresent 
as type L is counteracted by his improved reservation utility.  In fact, with further 
increases in b, the problem of countervailing incentive will get accentuated as the type L 





   17






We know from Proposition 1 that in this range of b full information offers are not 
incentive compatible for type L, though they are so for type H. In this range full 
information employment levels are such that . This immediately suggests that 
type L will now have an informational advantage, similar to what type H had earlier. This 
is clearly a case of incentive reversal. Type L now may have to be given information rent 
for truthful revelation, and is therefore, likely to enjoy a higher utility than his reservation 
level. Formally, in the firm’s optimization problem ICL and IRH constraints will bind. 
Writing
~




















   , and 
then substituting these in expected profit we need to solve the modified maximization 
problem: 




2 2 2 2

























   . 
Following the same procedure as before we determine optimal employment, wage and 
information rent.  The following proposition specifies the optimal contract.      
   
Proposition 3:    Assume 2 1 p p H     
(a) If  ] , ( 
  H H
a a
b  where 










  >1, the optimal 
menu consists of l lH
~














 . The 
worker’s utility is u and 

H u  H 0  L u .    18


















2 2 2 

















































.   
Proof: See Appendix 3 
Proposition 3 produces a mirror image of Proposition 2.  Now the incentive to 
misrepresent has shifted from type H to type L.  The reservation utility of H has increased 
so much that L can pretend to be H.  Even though by pretending to be type H, type L will 
have to work longer hours, but a significantly higher wage (which is necessary to employ 
H) more than outweighs his high disutility from work.  Realizing this reversal in 
incentive due to very high outside opportunity of type H, the firm will have to distort the 
employment of H in upward direction requiring him to work above the first best level. 
This will also involve increasing his wage above the first best level, but nevertheless he 
needs to be given just his reservation utility.  This helps restricting the type L’s ability to 
imitate H.  Type L is required to work at his first best level.  But due to his informational 




2.3   Countervailing Incentives 
In many agency contexts the agent’s incentive to misrepresent his ‘type’ (i.e. the 
information parameter) is not unidirectional.  In some situations he may prefer to present 
himself as a ‘high’ type and in other situations as a ‘low’ type against the same type of 
offer.  Generally this problem occurs when the agent’s type affects not only his payoff,   19
but also his reservation utility.  Lewis and Sappington (1989) introduced this feature in 
the classic regulation model of Baron and Myerson (1982).  They showed that optimal 
contracts would not be separating everywhere; in part it will be pooling.  However, 
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) re-examined this problem and showed that whether 
the contract will be fully separating or partly pooling depends on at what rate the agent’s 
outside opportunity changes with respect to his type.  This will also give rise to a 
particular pattern of inefficiency (i.e. distortion in output) and rent distribution in the 
second best contract.  This is commonly referred to as the countervailing incentive 
problem in the agency literature.  
Though in agency models types are generally assumed to be continuous and some 
of the above mentioned results of countervailing incentives are sensitive to this 
assumption, a similar problem occurs even with discrete types.  But with discrete types 
the source of the change in an agent’s reservation utility needs to be an exogenous 
parameter, which could be common knowledge.  By varying this parameter one can 
witness countervailing incentives essentially as a comparative static outcome.  Saha 
(2001) studied a model of this kind in the context of corruption, and Saha and Thampy 
(2006) followed up with a dynamic corruption problem.  Both papers show that standard 
agency results can be linked to wider institutional variables (such as policies) and change 
in these institutional variables can have dramatic effects on agency relations.  
In the present model, agent’s types are discrete (L and H) and the high type’s 
reservation utility does depend on his type, which is his private information.  This is a 
necessary ingredient for countervailing incentives.  But instead of changing his type 
continuously, we focus on a technological parameter, b that exclusively affects the high   20
type’s reservation utility. This parameter is known to the firm, and therefore, we are 
essentially studying the comparative static effects of this technological parameter.  In 
three propositions we have mapped out its various effects over the entire range of b. 
Some of the effects are, needless to say, dramatic.  
b
l
b1 b2 b3 b4






































In Figure 2 we summarize the employment effects.  The two employment curves 
are given as lL and lH.  At low values of b (below b1), the low type is underemployed at 
lL
A below his full information level lL
F, while the high type is employed at his full 
information level lH
F.  This is shown in Proposition 2.  As b increases beyond b1, the low 
type’s employment hits the constraint .  Therefore, we have  until b reaches b2.  
Between b2 and b3 employments of both types are held at their respective first best levels. 
This is proved in Proposition 1.  Beyond b3, employment is again distorted, but this time 




l lL   21
as shown in Proposition 3, lH stabilizes at lH
A.  This reversal of distortion from under-
employment to over-employment is necessary to separate the two types and it essentially 










So how does the worker’s utility change in the second best contract? In the first 
best contract, due to the monopoly power of the firm, the worker gets only his reservation 
utility.  In the second best contract, at least one of the two types is likely to get 
information rent giving him greater utility than his reservation level.  If there were no 
countervailing incentives and if both types had the same outside opportunity, type H 
would have had information rent over the entire range of b, while type L would have been 
pinned down to his reservation utility (which is zero by assumption).  But countervailing 
incentive causes a reversal of fortune.  In the initial stage, type H (up to point b1) enjoys 
utility above his reservation level via information rent.  But thereafter he is restricted to 
his reservation utility.  When b increases significantly and exceeds b4, type L gets 
information rent and his utility rises above the reservation level. Thus, both types can   22
earn rent, depending on the size of b.  As is also evident, between b1 and b4, neither type 
gets rent.  This is the flip side of countervailing incentives.  The principal, in this case the 
firm, benefits from the erosion of the agent’s informational advantage; it can even earn 
full information profit, which is indeed the case (between b1 and b4). 
 
3.   The Optimal Strategy of the Firm 
As is suggested by Figure 3 the firm’s profit tends to be greater in the presence of 
countervailing incentives than under standard second best contract. Nevertheless, it 
remains less than the first best profit overall.  Moreover, in the presence of asymmetric 
information the firm has to commit to a menu contract which induces the workers to self-
select according to their types.  So the firm has to make its decision on the basis of 
expected profit.  In contrast, under full information it can offer a type-specific contract 
depending on the worker’s type.  As we have seen earlier, it will hire the high type up to a 
critical value of b, namely , and the low type is employable if and only if . 
Under asymmetric information the menu contract is offered as long as 
.  When  and p2 is such that   the least the firm 
can do is offer a single-point contract that only the type L can accept.  This will be the 
first best contract for type L, which type H will not accept at all
_
b
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 .  But such a 
contract will be accepted only with probability p2.  As long as it is optimal to 
offer a single-point contract targeting type L rather than going to the spot market, and as 
long as  offering the menu contract is optimal than offering a single point 
contract to type L.   
0
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Let the firm’s expected full information profit be denoted as E














 . Also write  w l a
~ ~ ~    . Now utilizing the optimal wage 
employment as given in Propositions 1-3 we write the firm’s expected profit from the 
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Since at most only one type can earn rent at a given value of b, expected profit under 
asymmetric information cannot exceed the same under full information.  In particular, it 

















.  Furthermore, E
* is strictly less than the first best profit from 
employing type HH
*.  Thus we must have the following inequality:   
for  .  
*
H
* E E     
 a , b 0   24
It then follows that there exists a critical value of b, say  which is strictly less 
than  , such that above b , the menu contract will not be offered, which implies that the 
high type will not be hired, if b>b ; only the L type will be hired thereafter via a single-



























type H has no option but choose self-employment.  Of this, 
however, the sub-interval  accounts for asymmetric information, and over the 
remaining sub-interval  self-employment occurs even under full information. 
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, the firm switches to the 
spot market.  In this case, the firm is inclined to hire via contract a bit longer because of 
its relatively lower reservation profit.  The high type switches to self-employment over 
the interval  a , b
~
.  The range of self-employment is shorter now, but nevertheless   25
asymmetric information forces the high type to switch to self-employment much earlier 
than he would have, if there were complete information.  
Proposition 4:   If , the firm will hire both types via contract up to a 
critical value of b, namely   ( ).  At all 
0





ˆ b b    a b b , ˆ   it will hire 
only the type L, and type H will switch to self-employment. 
If , the critical value of b will rise to, say, b
0





( ). At all 
_ ~ ˆ b b b     a b b ,
~
  the firm switches to spot market, and 
both workers resort to their outside option. 
 
 
4.   Concluding Remarks 
  Immigrant workers and their labor force participation in the host countries have 
received critical attention in all concerned disciplines, principally owing to its strong 
implications for the well-being of the natives.  Of the several studies that dealt with the 
patterns and consequences aspects of labor migration, only a handful raises the issue of 
asymmetric information across transnational labor markets to distinction.  And yet, these 
attempts do not elucidate the explicit modalities that should define the wage-employment 
choices made by local employers in the wake of labor migration and in particular, when 
the skill levels and productivities of such migrants are private information.  We impinge 
upon this specific gap in the subject. 
  The model and the results display a variety of optimal contracts offered as a menu 
by the local employers when asymmetric information regarding immigrants’ 
productivities forces them to deviate from the first best attainable under full information   26
regimes.  We have shown that, quite dramatically, the firm continues to offer first best 
contracts even under imperfect information if the production technology adopted in the 
alternative occupation, namely self-employment, lies within specific bounds.  This not 
only expands the choice set facing the firms while offering profit maximizing wage-
employment contracts (beyond the spot market; Oi, 1962), but also presents various 
implications with regard to the labor market participation of the immigrants themselves.  
Any value of the technology parameter outside this range does not allow efficient 
separation of the skill types and would drive the optimal contract to its second-best level, 
as regularly encountered under asymmetric information.  In addition, we have shown that 
for such values of ‘b’ there are incentives on the part of both types to misrepresent their 
true productivities, so much so that, it gives rise to countervailing incentives for both – a 
situation whereby misrepresentation ceases to be unidirectional in nature.  More 
specifically, for appropriately high values of b, there are incentive reversals in the sense 
that the skill type that then receives information rent for truthful revelation is not the one 
that enjoyed the same before.  The menu therefore, clearly identifies specific and 
substantially large ranges of b over which the high types choose self-employment when 
the contract is not offered and the high-skilled workers are not hired.  Non-existence of b 
within the specified range (the large range outside comprises of both full information and 
asymmetric information regimes) signifies the case whereby the better skilled would take 
up the outside options, which is self-employment and much in conformity with the 
empirical evidence.   
  Viewed from the immigrants’ pay-offs it is established that under first best 
contracts each type receives only his reservation utility, which molds into information   27
rent at least for one of the types as soon as the second best contract is reached.  In the 
absence of countervailing incentives the high type continues to receive such rent over the 
entire range of the technology parameter.  But in the presence of it there is reversal of 
fortune in favor of the low type once b exceeds a critical level.  It is also possible that 
none receives any rent within a specific range of b.  A mapping of this exhaustive set of 
possibilities is a considerable improvement in the understanding of how firms and 
immigrants interact in the labor market when information is a private good. 
  The pragmatic implications of this analytical exercise are quite appealing to say in 
the least.  If the firms are able to implement a menu contract of the nature devised here, it 
not only helps in maximizing profits when types and productivities of non-natives are 
private information, but also in eroding away various inefficiencies associated with 
asymmetric information in the labor market.  Thus, despite recognition of the fact that 
immigrants are a major source of skilled and non-skilled workforce in many rich 
countries and that the problem of asymmetric information is a natural consequence of 
such labor market entries, firm level policies to correct allocational and matching 
inefficiencies have never found prominence.  The present study is undoubtedly a step in 
that direction too.  Furthermore, ex post the optimal first and second best contracts 
adopted by the firms are also resonant with empirical evidence on proportional 
overrepresentation of immigrants in self-employment/entrepreneurship.  Albeit the 
formal derivations of these contracts were absent, these were perhaps the best practical 
responses adopted by the firms (explaining the high incidence of self-employment) with 
the additional inferences here showing at what values/ranges of the technology parameter 
the corresponding wage-employment contracts offered were more appropriate than not.    28
In a nutshell therefore, the study is an attempt at intellectual clarity to separate and 
identify explicit wage-employment contracts offered to immigrants and its consequences 
on the choice of occupation facing these groups.  It may be extended in several other 
directions by including specifications of credit markets that may be necessary elements 
for the existence of outside options; spillover of information asymmetries onto other 
factor markets and so on.                                    




1.   Proof of Proposition 1 
(a) We need to show that when b lies in the stated interval, both the IRH and IRL 
constraints will bind, and both the incentive constraints, ICH and ICL, are satisfied. 


























*   
in (5.1) and (5.2). They are satisfied with equality. Next, check the IC constraints with the 





















 , ICL remains strictly non-binding, but the ICH binds with equality. On 





 ,  ICH remains strictly nonbinding, but ICL binds with 








 , the first best contracts fail to satisfy ICH, which means that H will 
strictly prefer to choose L’s contract.  Hence, the first best contracts are no longer   29





  the first best contracts fail to satisfy ICL, and 
therefore are no longer optimal. QED 
2.   Proposition 2 
The following lemma may be useful in the proof.  
Lemma : In an optimal menu contract the following must hold: (a) Both ICH and ICL 
cannot bind simultaneously. (b) At least one IR constraint must bind. (c) For any type i (i 
= H,L) of the two constraints ICi and IRi at least one will bind.    
 
Proof of Lemma: 

















w w      . Setting two 
right hand side terms equal we derive lL=lH. That is a contradiction to our assumption that 
the contracts are separating. 
(b) Suppose neither of IRH and IRL binds in an optimal menu contract. Then we can 
always find another menu contract that reduces wL and wH by an appropriately small  
such that the ICH and ICL constraints remain unaffected and yet IRH and IRL still remain 
nonbinding. Then clearly this new contract is more profitable; hence the original set of 
contracts was not optimal. This is a contradiction.  
(c) Without loss of generality suppose in an optimal contract, for type L neither ICL nor 



























w      , while IRH does not depend on wL.  Then the firm can 
increase its profit by reducing wL by  , such that both ICL and IRL continue to remain 
non-binding; such a wage reduction will clearly satisfy ICH and will not affect IRH 
because it does not depend on wL. If such profit improvement is possible, then the 
original contract was not optimal. Hence, at least one of the two constraints (IC and IR) 
for any type must bind. QED.  
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Proof of Proposition 2: 
In the optimal (menu) contract {(lH,wH), (lL,wL)} either   or  . In either cases, 
IRL and ICH must bind, and IRH binds only in the second case. Our proof proceeds in 
several steps. 
~
L l l 
~
L l l 
Step 1: To prove that IRL must bind, we assume otherwise. By part (c)  of the Lemma 
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. But this is a contradiction. So IRL must bind.  
  
Step 2: To prove that ICH must bind, assume otherwise. Then by part (c ) of the Lemma  
IRH must bind. From Step 1 we already know that IRL will bind. From these two binding 
















w   . Substitute these into the non-







. But this violates the 
employment constraint specified in the problem P’, which is again a contradiction. So 
ICH must bind.    
 












w    . After substituting these into the objective function we carry out the 
constrained maximization problem P’ and derive the first order conditions (7.1)-(7.3). If 
, we have =0, which gives lL and lH from (7.1) and (7.2) as stated in part (a) of 
Proposition 1.  If, however,  , (7.2) becomes irrelevant, though lH is still given by  
(7.1). Associated wage and utility expressions immediately follow. 
~
L l l 
~
L l l 
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Finally, to ascertain when the employment constraint binds, check with the optimal 
value of lL. This yields 
~






b  which is precisely the condition stated in part (a). 





b  , we must have  which is given in part (b) of the proposition. 
QED 
~
L l l 
 
3.   Proof of Proposition 3 
In the optimal contract now we have either   or  . In either cases, IRH and ICL 
must bind, and IRL binds only in the second case. Our proof follows the analogous steps 
of the proof of Proposition 2. 
~
H l l 
~
H l l 
 
Step 1: To prove that IRH must bind, we assume otherwise. By part (c) of the Lemma then 
ICH must bind, and by part (b) of the Lemma, IRL must bind. Obtain wH and wL from 







u   
 2 2
2 2
, because  . So this is a contradiction.  
~
H L l l l  
 
Step 2: To prove that ICL must bind, again we assume otherwise. From our Lemma it 
follows that IRL and IRH will bind. From these two binding constraints we get the 
expressions for wH and wL and then substitute into the non-binding ICL constraint, which 
then reduces to  , a contradiction to the employment constraint of problem P’.  
~
H l l 
 
Step 3: From the binding constraints IRH and ICL obtain appropriate wH and wL. After 
substituting these into the objective function we carry out the constrained maximization 
problem P’. The first order condition for lL is  0   L Ll a  from which we obtain the 
optimal value of lL as given in the proposition. The first order condition with respect to lH 
is (when ) 
~
H l l    0 2 1    H H H l p l a p   from which we get lH as given in part (b) of the 
proposition. Wages and utility expressions immediately follow.    32
Finally, check with the optimal value of lH. This yields 
~






 which is precisely 






 , we must have  which is given in 
part (a) of the proposition. QED 
~
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